Abstract-Riccati equations are the basis to construct Nash equilibrium solutions for linear quadratic (LQ) non-cooperative games when players apply linear state feedback strategies. Diagonal-form solutions of the Riccati equation associated with a second-order two-player non-zero sum linear quadratic game is discussed and the Nash equilibrium can be implemented by decentralized control strategies. The result is also extended to a high order two-player linear quadratic game.
studied a sufficient condition such that the solution to the Riccati equation associated with a scalar system exists. Papavassilopoulos and Olsder [8] studied for the first time the global existence of solutions of closed loop Nash matrix Riccati equations, but the game studied in this paper is of special form: the two players must have the same control matrices in the system equation and the same control weighting matrices in the performance indices. In [9] , Cruz and Chen provided a series solution to the asymmetric Riccati equations associated with open-loop non-cooperative games. Papavassilopoulos, Cruz and Medanic [10] [11] studied sufficient conditions for local existence of solutions of coupled symmetric Riccati equations in nonzero-sum linear-quadratic games applying Brower's fixed-point theorem and comparison theorem. To our best knowledge, there are no general solutions for the existence of solutions of nth-order M-player Riccati equations associated with game problems.
In this paper, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of diagonal-form solutions of Riccati equations associated with a linear quadratic second-order two-player non-cooperative game, where each player has complete information structure and applies control strategies of linear feedback of system states. Consequently the Nash equilibrium solution can be constructed when each player uses only decentralized control strategy. The structure of this paper is arranged as follows: the next section describes a second-order linear quadratic game which involves two players and the Riccati equation associated with this game is also introduced; then in section III, existence conditions for diagonal-form Riccati equation solutions are provided and consequently the Nash equilibrium solution implemented by decentralized control is obtained explicitly in terms of the system coefficients. In section IV, the result of the second-order system is extended to a 2n-order (n>1) linear system and section V is the conclusion.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. A 2nd order 2-player Nonzero-sum Game A second-order 2-player nonzero-sum linear-quadratic game is described by (1) X1= a,x± + a2X2 +±bll (X1(to ) = X10 ) (1 .a) X2 = a3X1 + a4X2 +b2u2 (X2 (to) = X20 ) Ji (x, U1,u2) = X (tf )CiX(tf ) + t (xTQiX + Ui2 + r,,u'2)dt (i, j =1, 2; i#j) (Lb) where xi E R (i=1,2) are the two system states and denote the state vector x(t) =(X (t), X2 (t))T with x(t0) = x = (Xlo IX210 )T ai E R (i=1,...,4) and bi E R (i=1,2) are the scalar system coefficients with a, . 0 (i=2,3) and b1 . 0 (i=1,2). In From part II, we know that Nash equilibrium solutions are dependent on the solutions of Riccati equations. Observing (6) and the structure of B (i= 1, 2), if 0i (i=1, 2) is diagonal, then ui will be a strategy only involving state x, (i=1,2) and the resulted closed-loop system is a decentralized control system. One of the merits of decentralized systems is the reduction of system complexity. Sometimes players may have incomplete information structure due to physical constraints, e.g. player i only has access to state x,(i=1,2) so that the Nash equilibrium solution can only be formed by partial state feedback strategies. This is another motivation to study the possibility of constructing Nash Equilibrium solutions by decentralized control. In this part, conditions on system coefficients to guarantee the diagonal-form solution of Riccati equations (4.a) and (5) Under condition (8), (18) is a direct result after substituting (7) into (6) (7) and / or (12) may be indefinite. But note that 01 and V2 in (7) and (12) are nonnegative. This is consistent with the facts that q,>20, cH1>0 and u12 having a posive coefficient (which is actually normalized to be 1) in Ji (i= 1,2). 5) Riccati equation (4.a) and (5) may have multiple solutions. So there may exist multiple Nash equilibria for Game (1) . In this section, only the diagonal-form Riccati equation solution is discussed. The Nash equilibria constructed on the basis of diagonal-form Riccati equation solutions are of special partial linear state feedback structure. The resultant closed-loop system is a decentralized control system 6) By the definition of strong time consistency in [13] , the strong time consistency property of Nash equilibrium (18) and (22) 75i3 A)i quadratic game is also extended to a 2n (n >1) order linear quadratic game.
The discussion in this paper is about the relationships among the three problems in [14] : the general problem (given the system model and the performance index, to derive the optimal control or Nash strategy), the inverse problem (given the system model and the optimal control or Nash strategy,, find the performance index such that the optimal control or Nash strategy is valid) and the converse problem (given the performance index and the optimal control or Nash strategy, find the system model such that the optimal control or Nash strategy is valid). Hopefully the discussion in this paper will provide some additional insights to the design degree of freedom for two-player linear quadratic non-cooperative second-order games.
